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INTRODUCTION     
This article aims to advance understanding of the degree of influence which the EU has 
been able to exert in global institutional contexts through a focus on electronic network 
communications. The article is intra-sectorally comparative in nature, since its focus is on 
the Internet and telecommunications through an exploration of the evolving international 
political economy of both sub-sectors of communications, with which the EU is shown to 
have had a significant degree of engagement. There has been little work on the role of the 
EU in global electronic network communications, less still on a direct cross-comparison 
of its performance globally within this sector. 
The article shows how, in telecommunications, a long-established sector with historically 
very strong national embeddedness and operational centricity, the EU was able to 
establish and exert a role for itself, and fulfill its constructed aims, in the international 
telecommunications policy-making arena. The article argues that this occurred because of 
two primary factors: the establishment of a governance framework at the EU level in 
which the European Commission, in particular, came to play a very significant role; and 
recognition that the EU could prove a useful way of promulgating and securing the 
interests of its Member States in global telecommunications policy making. Importantly, 
the EU’s relatively high profile and achievement in respect of the first element had a 
direct bearing on its ability to be influential in respect of the second. The example of this 
highlighted in the article is negotiations that led to the establishment of the Agreement on 
Basic Telecommunications (ABT) in the World Trade Organization in the late 1990s. 
However, beyond this, the EU continues to play an important strategic role in 
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representing its Member States in broader discussions on the evolution of global 
telecommunications. 
By contrast, the Internet is the newest core element of international electronic network 
communications. Unlike telecommunications, it did not develop within any of the 
territories of the EU Member States. From the early 1990s onwards, it became 
popularised and internationalized ‘outwards’ from the USA. As a consequence, the 
Internet presented an unfamiliar series of challenges for EU Member States and, 
simultaneously, opportunities to the EU which the latter has aimed to address. The article 
shows how in these circumstances, the EU has been able to present itself as an 
institutional means of ‘interpreting’ and influencing the evolving global Internet 
governance agenda. However, the EU has only been partially successful in assuming this 
role, in contrast to telecommunications, for four reasons: the more contested nature of 
global Internet governance; the more challenging strategic environment within which the 
EU has had to operate; the lack of a formal legal mandate for constructing policy on 
Internet governance; and the problem of multiple EU voices. Unlike telecommunications, 
the EU has only been able to make ‘incremental’ progress in meeting its aims in shaping 
the global Internet governance regime. Though there is evidence to suggest that EU 
institutional mechanisms for constructing positions on Internet governance are now more 
consensual on key issues problems do remain in identifying exactly who speaks for the 
EU in international Internet governance fora. 
The empirical work underpinning this article comprises: documentary analysis of key 
primary source materials on EU policies for the Internet and telecommunications; policy 
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documentation produced by the main international organisations with which the EU has 
engaged in respect of the communications policy issues covered in this article; and a 
range of face to face, telephone and email interviews conducted over a seven year period 
with policy officials from the EU engaged with the international organisations for 
electronic communications covered in this article, and key national stakeholders. The 
article is structured as follows. The next section outlines the constituents of the 
comparative analytical framework to be employed in considering the EU’s influence in 
global Internet and telecommunications policy contexts. The subsequent two sections 
analyse the key features of the EU’s role in global telecommunications and Internet 
policy making respectively. The final section of the article compares the EU’s 
performance in both cases and puts forward some conclusions regarding the conditions 
under which the EU is more likely, and less likely, to be influential as an international 
actor in global electronic communications policy.   
THE EU AS AN ACTOR IN GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS: 
FRAMEWORK FOR COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS  
Telecommunications and the Internet provide useful case contexts for exploring the 
significance of the EU as an international institutional actor since they possess essential 
similarities but also important differences (see Table 1). Both sub-sectors are 
characterized as being at the leading edge of technological change where a wealth of new 
services and market opportunities have consequently arisen. Related to this, both sub-
sectors have gone through in the last 20 or so years a remarkable phase of 
internationalization and are often seen as standard bearers of economic globalization and 
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expansion. This is the case both in the characteristics of their markets and, associated 
with this, the further expansionary international potential in each. More broadly, both the 
Internet and telecommunications are sectors in which the propensity for change across the 
board in technologies, products and services, markets, and governance institutional 
contexts is relatively high. Finally, in both cases, though for very different reasons, the 
historical presence of the EU as an actor has been low (in the case of 
telecommunications) and minimal (in the case of the Internet).  
However, the sectors also display some interesting and potentially significant differences. 
This is pertinent, in particular, to the regulatory governance and related institutional 
contexts within which they have evolved. As noted above, telecommunications, unlike 
the Internet, has historically had a strong national centric developmental history in 
Europe and beyond. The Internet’s pre-popularisation development occurred in the US 
though its communicative potential led, by the mid-1990s, to the realization that its future 
course would be global. Importantly, through the last 20 years, each of these contexts has 
been the subject of significant upheaval. Telecommunications and the Internet are also 
notably different in respect of the prevalence of international institutional contexts for 
their treatment, which is historically well established in the former in the shape of the 
International Telecommunication Union and embryonic, at best, in the case of the latter. 
However, once again, it is important to note that in telecommunication the traditional 
governance institutional context altered significantly around the same time as that for the 
Internet was forming, often in turbulent circumstances. Finally, and related to the 
previous point, the historic shape and practices of governance in the cases of the Internet 
and telecommunications were markedly different. In the former, a liberal self–regulatory 
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model was in operation, whilst the latter displayed strong state led governance. Notably, 
however, as in the case of the previous two contexts of difference, governance forms and 
practices have been the subject of change entailing significant moments of contestation in 
recent years. Thus, difference provides as important a comparative context for exploring 
the significance of the EU as an international actor in communications, as the similarities 
outlined above. 
Table 1 HERE   
In order to illuminate the significance of the above comparative criteria in understanding 
the EU’s influence in the global telecommunications and Internet sectors, the article 
employs a three dimensional analytical framework that draws on the literature on EU 
actorness (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; 2008), the EU in international organizations 
(Jørgensen 2009) and the EU as a strategic actor (Smith and Xei 2009) which comprises:  
opportunities that have enabled or constrained EU influence in the external environment 
of events, ideas and power; the EU’s capacity to act by virtue of its own identity and the 
EU internal context it faces; and, from the first two criteria, the EU’s performance in 
shaping the governance contexts of the two cases under investigation, in respect of its 
own stated goals, the degree to which the institutional contexts in which it operates are 
open to change, and the relative strength of the most prominent institutional actors which 
the EU faces.     
Opportunity (Bretherton and Vogler 2006; 2008) related to the external politico-
institutional environment (Jørgensen 2009; 12), also termed the logic of the external 
opportunity structure (Smith and Xie 2009; 9), refers to the pressures and opportunities 
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(to act) that arise from broader international structures in terms of both social and 
material content. For Jørgensen (2009: 12) this entails examination of the: 1) 
international distribution of power 2) international interaction and social structures 3) the 
influence of other governments (and organizations) and 4) the international cultural 
environment. When analysing telecommunications and Internet governance these are 
important factors, not least because these two sub-sectors of communications, and the 
EU’s role within them, have evolved under different actor constellations, with the 
interaction between the EU and US important in both. Local, national and global 
conditions and pressures also exist within different, though in part overlapping, 
timeframes in both cases. There are contrasting global institutions often underpinned by 
contested governance principles in each case. Within telecommunications, for example, 
the movement away from the embedded liberalism of the 1970s towards the promotion of 
neoliberal ideas in the global political economy in the 1980s, of which the EU (through 
the European Commission) was a key protagonist, meant that it was ideally placed to 
influence the institutions that would govern world trade (WTO) and indeed to take a 
prominent position (alongside the US), in constructing, promoting and successfully 
embedding its own governance goals for the telecommunications sector internally and 
outwards through the WTO.        
Within Internet governance, it was less ideas than events that gave the EU opportunity to 
intervene in the evolution of the global institutions that would provide rules for governing 
the sector. The US was the hegemonic actor in the evolution of the Internet and 
subsequently the early structures and institutions that governed it. The Internet evolved 
within the US, but by the mid-1990s the pressures of commercialization led to a call for 
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reforms from key national and international stakeholders and, with this, the globalization 
of Internet governance in order to provide a legitimate and legal basis for its increased 
use socially, financially and economically. As authors have demonstrated in their analysis 
of the creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 
the US government was instrumental in resolving tensions between rival coalitions 
(Mueller 2002; Singh 2009) in order to establish ICANN’s identity for this purpose 
(albeit contested): as a private, not-for-profit, organization underpinned by the principle 
of self-regulation and governed by US (California) law. Thus, whilst the EU was not in a 
position to intervene in the initial deliberations and decisions of the US government to 
resolve ‘internal’ contestation and tensions in relation to the Internet, its established 
identity as an important economic actor in the global political economy enabled it to enter 
the fray with the intention of playing a prominent role with the US, in defining the 
principles that would underpin ICANN working practices. In summary then, it was the 
pressures of globalization and the ideology of neoliberalism emanating from the US 
domestically, that allowed the EU to intervene as a significant actor within 
telecommunications, whereas with Internet governance, it was not the pressures of 
globalization/neoliberalism that drove the process per se, but rather the need to move to 
global structures in order to ensure the interoperability of the Internet.       
The second aspect of the article’s analytical framework refers to EU internal factors 
(Jørgensen 2009; 10). This reflects the EU’s capability to respond to opportunities in any 
given sector in order to shape the evolving (institutional) order. It raises a number of 
concerns germane to this article. The first is how the EU’s internal logic – its institutional 
structures and internal politics - shape the positions being taken in relation to 
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telecommunications and Internet governance. Related to this are questions of not only 
internal coherence and consistency – that is vertical (between different levels of 
responsibility) and horizontal (between EU institutions) (see Nuttall 2005) - but also of 
which actors influence EU positions and projections (including private companies, 
transnational actors and interest groups) and who represents the EU in the relevant 
international institutions within the sectors under investigation (Jørgensen 2009: 11). This 
is important, as internal executive division and more than one institutional voice can 
often lead to a lack of coherence, coordination and clarity in the EU’s position and thus 
external capacity to influence. However, and as others have argued, many EU actor 
voices in any given international institution need not necessarily lead to ineffectiveness. 
As long as there is consistency and clarity in the message projected this might well 
facilitate an image among third parties, especially in the developing world, of the EU as a 
non-hegemonic and equal partner rather than hierarchical actor within negotiations and 
deliberations (Elgström 2007; Kissack 2009).. Overall, what is salient in terms of 
analysing internal factors is to illuminate the extent to which EU policy processes either 
constrain or facilitate action in response to ‘opportunity’.  
The third dimension of the analytical framework is the EU’s ‘presence’ as an actor within 
any given issue area. For Allen and Smith (1990), presence captures the multidimensional 
aspects of the EU in world affairs and its considerable structure, salience and legitimacy 
in processes of international politics. They focus on the external behaviour of the EU and 
the perceptions of other international actors in assessing its ability to act, asking questions 
of how the EU can make its presence felt and indeed, how it can move from presence to 
purpose. Bretherton and Vogler (2006) define presence as the ability of the EU to shape 
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the perceptions, expectations and behaviour of others, and exert influence beyond its 
borders. However, for them, presence does not denote purposive external action. Taking 
the concept further, and building on the definition of Bretherton and Vogler in the context 
of regionalism, Hettne (2007: 110) defines presence as an expression of the impact of the 
region on its external environment, and argues that purposive action is an important 
component of actorness that requires an active element: the conscious effort to influence 
international order in accordance with one’s own values and interests.   
We use presence in a similar way and define it as the ability of the EU to exert influence 
beyond its borders through purposive external action, whether normative or material in 
nature. Beyond this, and somewhat linked to the ‘opportunities’ and ‘EU internal’ 
contexts, presence also pertains to other important criteria. Firstly, the degree to which 
the structure and function of the international institution within which the EU operates is 
malleable or, put another way, the stability and rigidity of the body in question, is 
important. A second criterion is the number and relative strength of the actors which take 
their place in the institution in question and which the EU encounters, including the 
propensity of all institutional actors to form alliances. Finally, and very much related to 
Allen and Smith’s (1990) notion of legitimacy in defining presence, is the issue of the 
recognition of the EU as an actor within the opportunity structures that exist and the 
perception of the EU’s role within such opportunity structures in any given issue area.  
It is important to note that telecommunications and Internet governance are different 
cases that throw up different questions at an overarching level in terms of EU presence. 
As illustrated below, in telecommunications, the analysis is less about influencing the 
institutional form within which telecoms negotiations played out (that is, the World Trade 
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Organization), but rather the governance and policy framework for global 
telecommunications, underpinned by the EU’s own projection of what this should be and 
how it should function. In terms of Internet governance, the still contested and 
aspirational nature and identity of its global institutions, in particular the Internet 
Governance Forum, shifts the primary focus to the EU’s strategy and normative 
preferences for how such institutions should evolve and function. For 
telecommunications, the focus is on the EU’s construction of policy objectives and 
subsequent activities within the WTO in influencing (primarily) the Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications (ABT). In Internet governance, it is on how the EU has sought to 
shape the institutional design and reform of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN) and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).   
TELECOMMUNICATIONS  
Opportunity 
Telecommunications, the oldest part of electronic network communications, has been 
viewed as a sector of strategic international importance since the late 19th century. Since 
then, successive efforts were made to coordinate international telegraphy, and thereafter 
telephony, at the international institutional level, a key landmark in which was the 
establishment of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) as an agency of the 
United Nations in 1946. As telecommunications systems developed physically at the 
national level across the globe with the incremental roll out of infrastructure and delivery 
of service, so too developed a socio-economic normative framework for how 
telecommunications should be structured and delivered. This was predicated on the 
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efficacy of the intertwined assumptions of natural monopoly and the social policy 
aspiration of universal service. Thus, telecommunications functioning and development 
became a key constituent of national policies irrespective of the political character of the 
systems in which they developed. This notwithstanding, the need to realize the 
international, if not global, potential of telecommunications was recognized, though its 
pursuit was expressly underpinned by inter-national coordination in the development of 
technical and economic standards, rather than integration (see Hills 2002, 2007). The 
classic example here was the international accounting rate system, developed within the 
ITU, between the monopoly (usually state owned) telecommunications administrations, 
essentially a series of bilateral economic interface agreements to interconnect 
telecommunications traffic and share the associated call revenues.  
However, by the mid-1970s, this stable system of international telecommunications came 
under challenge from broader changes which were building in the international political 
economy. Here, upswings in the level of international production, driven by the efforts of 
increasingly powerful multinational companies, were underpinned by strongly articulated 
arguments in favour of increasing levels of international economic integration in pursuit 
of globalization. Electronic network communications came to be viewed by those at the 
forefront of economic internationalization as key tools to enable coordination and 
expansion of business activities. Technological changes which were occurring in 
telecommunications at the time promised faster and more sophisticated services with 
potentially global reach and were eagerly anticipated by corporate business users. At the 
same time, however, there was concern about the ability of the then existing structure of 
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domestic and international telecommunications to deliver what was demanded on time 
and to the required standard.  
As has been well established, the movement for economic globalization developed both 
as a normative and practical strategy for change (Cerny 2008). Here, free, competitive 
markets were extolled as a superior form of economic organization to nationalized, 
uncompetitive ones. Economic liberalism was reincarnated as free market neo-liberalism, 
very importantly with an international context and logic, packaged in the modernizing 
rhetoric of globalization. For neo-liberals, the telecommunications sector presented itself 
as a clear case for reform and development at the international level. This model was first 
articulated in the US, whose commercial and governmental interests became key 
advocates for change in telecommunications to be undertaken along neo-liberal lines. 
Pressure was exerted for the required political-institutional changes to be effected at the 
national and global levels. Implied in this was fundamental reorganization in the 
institutional governance of telecommunications (Humphreys and Simpson 2005). Thus, a 
model of replacing state ownership and provision with independent regulation of 
competitively ordered, internationally open, markets began to gain influence, initially, 
beyond the US, in the UK (Thatcher 1998). This presented a clear challenge to the 
architects of the traditional telecommunications systems nationally and internationally. 
For others, not least the European Union, it presented clear opportunities.  
EU internal  
As the 1980s evolved, the EU began to increase its focus on telecommunications as a 
policy area of strategic priority. In its policy statements, the European Commission took 
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significant pains to point out to Member States, many of whom were initially reticent 
about liberalization, the challenges presented by the EU’s main external economic 
competitors, the US and Japan, in a changing, increasingly globally competitive, sector to 
which Member States needed to respond (European Commission 1984). By contrast, the 
Commission showed political astuteness in also highlighting to Member States 
opportunities to be gained through utilizing the EU institutional context to effect 
necessary change in telecommunications. The EU was at the time pursuing the wider 
project of the Single European Market whose broad objectives, the Commission argued, 
were co-terminus with changes necessary in telecommunications. Key policy proposals 
were thus presented in a landmark Green Paper (European Commission 1987), effectively 
beginning a process of significant transfer of sovereignty from the national to the EU 
level in telecommunications. As a consequence, the character of telecommunications 
governance in Europe has been very significantly ‘EU-ised’. Whilst the Southern states 
of the EU (France, Spain and Italy principally) as well as some of its smaller states, were 
initially reticent about adopting the reform of telecommunications along the lines 
proposed by the Commission, by the early 1990s all EU Member States had accepted 
neo-liberal arguments, propounded forcefully by increasingly commercially oriented 
telecommunications service providers, multinational business users and key powerful EU 
States such as the UK, Germany, and eventually, France (see Humphreys and Simpson 
2005). The Commission’s policy persuasiveness in its ‘domestic’ context was soon to be 
replicated in its efforts to secure a united EU negotiating front in telecommunications at 
the global institutional level. 
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Internally therefore, since the late 1980s, a battery of legislation has developed at EU 
level prescribing the shape of liberalized and harmonized telecommunications across the 
EU (Thatcher 2001, Goodman 2006, Thatcher and Coen 2008). Successive regulatory 
packages have been devised and refined through time. A clear pattern of vertically 
ordered institutional resources for the delivery of the EU telecommunications framework 
is discernible (Michalis 2007). At the supranational level, the European Commission has 
played a key role in proposing legislation upon which Member states vote, but also in 
monitoring the implementation of agreed measures. This it does in conjunction with a 
series of independent national regulatory authorities. Whilst this process has been far 
from smooth, there is no doubt that the EU has become a key actor in the functioning and 
evolution of a competitively ordered, increasingly internationally oriented 
telecommunications sector in the EU. There has also been some important regulatory 
institution building at the European level in the shape of the European Regulators Group 
and its replacement, the Body of European Regulators in Electronic Communications 
(Simpson 2009, 2011). 
Presence 
Whilst the EU has grown in institutional importance in telecommunications internally, it 
has also developed its presence as an international political actor on behalf of its Member 
States in telecommunications, through the projection of a particular normative 
(ideological) model and exerting its material interests. A sign of this was European 
Commission’s efforts as far back as the late 1980s to challenge the ITU’s well established 
system of international telecommunications bilateral accounting rates. The Commission 
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argued that these rates were a gross over-estimation of the economic cost of providing 
international voice telephonic services. It is interesting to note that both large corporate 
business telecommunications users, represented in peak level bodies such as the 
International Telecommunications Users Group and, very importantly, the US 
government, were key powerful advocates of the position taken by the European 
Commission (Humphreys and Simpson 2005). This period also witnessed a broader 
institutional challenge to the ITU’s dominance in telecommunications which was 
reflective of the paradigmatic changes occurring across the sector and in the broader 
global political economy. Specifically, as economic globalization rose up the political 
agenda, issues of international trade and associated marketisation measures became 
paramount, leading to the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.  
The WTO immediately became the institutional focus for advocates of the global neo-
liberal model of telecommunications and in the process represented a powerful challenge 
to the ITU. Unlike in the latter, the EU was able to position itself prominently within the 
new WTO and proved effective in securing and putting forward a united position from its 
Member States in key negotiations that led to the WTO Agreement on Basic 
Telecommunications (ABT) in 1997. Whilst far from centre stage in the Uruguay Round 
of trade negotiations which culminated in 1994 and led to the inception of the WTO, 
telecommunications was nonetheless a prominent sector tabled by states in which the 
neo-liberal model had been adopted. The key players interested in developing a global 
trade agreement were the US, but also Japan and the EU.  
 16 
In 1994, a landmark, though far from universally adopted, trade liberalization agreement 
in advanced telecommunications services was secured as part of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services. However, a larger goal was the creation of a global trade agreement 
on so-called basic telecommunications services, intensively pursued in the WTO in the 
immediate years after its inception and leading to the creation of the ABT in 1997. 
Throughout the negotiations leading to the latter, the European Commission was a key 
player. Between 1988 and 1994, EU Member States had made agreements at EU level to 
liberalise all telecommunications services and infrastructures by 1998. However, there 
was reticence among some EU states, notably France, at pursuing market liberalization in 
the global institutional context. The European Commission was assisted by the fact that, 
according to Singh (2008), negotiations that occurred were of a technocratic, problem-
solving nature. Here, the EU’s ‘Article 113 Committee’, named after the legal measure 
which permits the European Commission to represent its Member States in international 
negotiations, was important in developing common negotiating values in the face of 
skepticism from a number of its own states, such as France. In fact, through ensuring that 
its Member States made a commitment to allowing 100% foreign ownership market 
access, the EU even went beyond the parameters of its internal telecommunications 
liberalization programme (Singh 2008). 
A key aspect of the ABT, aside from liberalization commitments made by signatories, 
was the adoption of the so-called Reference Paper (adopted by 63 of the original 69 
signatories of the ABT) which amounts to a series of disciplines aimed at delivering the 
promised market access and opening and free competition of the ABT. Whilst the US 
was the initial driver of the Reference Paper, the negotiations leading to its adoption, in 
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which the European Commission played a key role, saw the paper develop very much 
along the lines of the liberalization and harmonization package agreed among EU 
Member States, even to the extent of including a commitment on universal service 
provision in an overwhelmingly liberal market package (Humphreys and Simpson 2005). 
More recently, the EU has continued to press for a widening and deepening of the ABT. 
In 2000, for example, it put forward a proposal that all WTO Members ‘commit for 
Modes 1,2, and 3 all sub-sectors and all modes [of telecommunications services] without 
restrictions…and include as additional commitments the whole Reference Paper on BT’ 
(WTO 2000: 4). In 2005, it joined a key list of allies, including the US, Canada, Japan 
and Hong Kong China to urge all WTO Members to do similarly (WTO 2005). Beyond 
international trade liberalization in the WTO, the EU has more recently aimed to 
consolidate its position as a key actor in developing and representing its Member States’ 
interests in telecommunications on the global stage. In 2007, it launched a wide-ranging 
consultation as part of its i2010 initiative aimed at producing a new EU strategy, one aim 
of which was to promote ‘the competitiveness of Europe’s ICT industry in global markets 
and promote EU interests worldwide’ (European Commission 2007: 1).   
INTERNET GOVERNANCE  
Opportunity/External logics 
The EU’s involvement in, and influence on, the evolution of a global Internet governance 
system effectively came about after the rapid evolution of the Internet in the US through 
first military, and then academic and civilian networks. In contrast to 
telecommunications, the EU only obliquely articulated an interest in the Internet in the 
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Bangemann report, Europe and the Global Information Society (1994). Nevertheless, an 
opportunity for increased involvement in shaping the evolution of global institutions for 
the management of Internet address domain names emerged in a context where the US 
government was the leading strategic actor by virtue of the fact that it effectively ‘owned’ 
the ‘A’ root server at the core of this system’s functioning. Despite this the potential 
global interoperability of the Internet meant that important international actors, the EU 
among them, had to be included in any process of the internationalization of domain 
names. In this context, the EU’s presence was exerted through its own normative 
preferences and value creating tactics (see Singh 2008: 241) for the global 
institutionalization of the domain name system, even though the US was, in essence, the 
primary negotiating actor among the many other interests and coalitions involved.    
Thus, the normative parameters for the governance of domain names were decided by the 
intervention of the US government in the domestic debate and international deliberation 
that emerged on globalizing domain names. The outcome in terms of governance 
structure and principles was ICANN, a self-regulatory, not-for-profit, private 
organization underpinned by US law, which was effectively a compromise between those 
with a post-industrial vision of the Internet (the technical community) and those with 
commercial and economic interests that wanted a clear legal basis for the expansion of 
domain names. Whilst the EU had produced guidelines for the governance of Electronic 
Commerce through its Bonn Ministerial Declaration (1997) essentially reflective of those 
in the Framework for Global Electronic Commerce produced by the US, it was in the 
subsequent debates and negotiations over a US Department of Commerce Green paper 
(1998a) and statement of policy in the form of a White paper (1998b) that the EU, and 
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more specifically, the European Commission, reacted to the US position, securing several 
concessions. The EU criticised US unilateral control of the emerging domain name 
system and a lack of multilateral governmental influence in proposals to establish 
ICANN.  Several years after ICANN’s establishment, the 2008 global financial crisis and 
the expiration of the exclusive contractual oversight agreement between the US 
government and ICANN (the Joint Project Agreement)1 provided the space and 
opportunity for the EU to take stock of its achievements in Internet governance and to 
reassert its preferred way forward, focusing in particular on how external and multilateral 
accountability could be incorporated into ICANN processes. 
EU-internal  
The above dynamic opportunity structure within the global Internet governance space 
provided the European Commission with a relative advantage compared to the EU 
Member States2 early on. Key individuals in its Directorate General Information Society 
(DG IS) developed strong epistemic knowledge of the Internet allowing the Commission 
to assert itself as something of a policy entrepreneur in Internet governance. An ad hoc 
group – the Internet Informal Group (IIG) - was established within the Council of 
Ministers under the initiative of Christopher Wilkinson, from DG IS. Wilkinson was also 
instrumental in proposing the launch and construction of the EU’s own top level domain 
name, .eu (Christou and Simpson 2006, 2007). However, as time proceeded, the influence 
of the Commission was constrained by national governmental representatives within the 
EU High Level Group on Internet Governance (HLGIG) which was established internally 
and separate to the IIG to provide strategic direction on Internet governance. The IIG still 
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exists as an informal body chaired by the Commission consisting of Member State 
ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) representatives. Whilst the IIG is not 
a policy making forum, ‘it is a way of like-minded European GAC reps doing a bit of 
thought-sharing and reporting [before ICANN meetings] so they can share their 
knowledge’ (authors’ interview, April 2010).  
In contrast to telecommunications, it is important to note that there is no formal mandate 
or process for the construction of EU positions on Internet governance. Thus, although 
the HLGIG is the lead coordinating actor it has no formal requirement to do so. It has 
‘developed a mechanism for drafting and consulting on what [EU] letters or positions 
would say whether they be from the Commission or the Presidency’ (authors’ interview, 
April 2010) but it only does this on the basis of issues that it deems important that the EU 
speaks on with a single voice and message (such as the expiration of the JPA and the 
review of the IGF). The lack of a formal legal competence has several implications for 
internal (in) coherence and the way in which messages are projected on Internet 
governance, often leading to tensions between the Commission (especially under former 
Commissioner Viviane Reding3) and the HLGIG, and between other key GAC players 
and the Commission (authors’ interview, April 2010). It has also meant that no formal 
EU representative sits on the GAC - the Commission has a seat because of .eu, but does 
not represent the EU as a whole. There are also individual EU Member State 
representatives which though they meet before any GAC meeting through the IIG, do not 
speak with an EU voice but as representatives of their respective countries.  
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Within the broader Internet governance processes and fora, the EU has been represented 
by both the country holding the EU Presidency and the European Commission but not 
always in a consistent or coordinated way. This multi-representation is also evident 
within the IGF and alongside the lack of any formal process EU representation (presence) 
has been a source of confusion for other actors and stakeholders, exacerbating the well-
recognised problem of who speaks for the EU. It has often led to divergent positions, 
with the HLGIG (as principal) on occasion having to rein in an often ambitious 
Commission (as agent) with its own political agenda (authors’ interview, April 2010). 
Where the Commission has sought to project uncoordinated messages, the HLGIG has 
requested that it retract them publicly or at least acknowledge that they were Commission 
only views. However, the informality of the internal EU process has worked well at times 
in producing and projecting coherent, purposeful and consistent EU positions, as was the 
case in the deliberations for renewing the IGF mandate and the Affirmation of 
Commitments (AoC) which replaced the JPA.   
Presence 
Given the informal nature of the construction of positions on Internet governance it is not 
surprising that the EU, despite its presence, has had mixed results in achieving its initial 
policy objectives on Internet governance (see European Commission 2009). An 
explanation for this can be found in the strategic role of the US in negotiations and 
deliberations, the undecided and contested nature of Internet governance among the 
actors involved given their differing interpretations of the core principles that should 
underpin the system, and the multiple EU voices projected on Internet governance.  
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In terms of ICANN, the EU, led by the European Commission, was able to act 
purposefully and exert influence in obtaining important concessions in the initial 
negotiations for its construction. Specifically, its normative reasoning underpinned by 
notions of co-regulation, alongside the need for the US to achieve consensus, ensured the 
creation of the GAC within ICANN. Although the GAC allayed European concerns to a 
degree, it was not seen as completely satisfactory given that it did not guarantee an equal 
status for governments in the decision-making process where issues of public policy were 
concerned (Christou and Simpson 2006, 2007). In addition the main mechanism for 
accountability and oversight of ICANN was controlled by the US. The European 
Commission with the support of other international actors (such as the Intellectual 
Property (IP) community) also employed tactics of a normative nature in securing the 
creation of a Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy through the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) (see Singh 2008: 244-5).          
Since its inception, both within and outside ICANN, the EU has sought to secure 
movement on the two issues that it initially thought problematic when the former was 
established; that is, unilateral oversight by the US government, and the role of 
governments within the organization. Whilst through socialization and reform the 
governments within the GAC have acquired a de facto political veto right to decide on 
issues with public policy relevance (Kleinwachter 2008: 17), the EU has not achieved its 
aim of complete equality between governance actors. The global financial crisis and the 
subsequent questioning of self-regulation provided a general context for the Commission 
to reinforce its concern about the ‘due consideration given by the ICANN Board to GAC 
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advice’ (European Commission, Interview, 2009), and to push its case for further reform 
that provides equality for governments in ICANN procedures.  
However, whilst certain Commission projections have advocated more than an advisory 
role for governments in Internet governance, a representative of the HLGIG has 
suggested its position ‘is to ensure that what it [GAC] says is respected by the 
Board…and the Board justifies any decision not to follow GAC advice’ (authors’ 
interview, April 2010). In the context of the new Affirmation of Commitments4, which is 
providing more of role for the GAC with regard to ICANN accountability and 
representations to its Board, the EU position is that ‘…we [the HLGIG] are supporting 
the multistakeholder model…governments have a role to play and governments have a 
greater role under the AoC…but as do the other constituencies as well…so we are not 
arguing that there should be more government intervention in the management of 
ICANN…’ (authors’ interview, 2010).  
This is a view that is supported by Commission officials involved in Internet governance 
(European Commission 2009), and reflected in a Presidency statement in support of the 
AoC and its new review procedures.  However, certain projections under the leadership 
of former IS and Media Commissioner Reding suggested a much stronger role for 
governments within ICANN and Internet governance such as her call for a ‘G12’ for 
Internet Governance (2009). This intervention was not only uncoordinated internally, but 
left stakeholders ‘surprised’ in the multi-stakeholderism context (Internet Governance 
Hearing, May 2009), and the EU embarrassed in its official representations and 
projections for Internet governance. The official EU view appears to resonate with that of 
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other salient Internet governance stakeholders where merely a fine-tuning of the current 
multi-layered, multi-stakeholder system, is advocated with a clear definition of roles and 
functions for the actors involved (especially governments) rather than ‘more’ intervention 
and regulation by the state (Internet Governance Hearing, May 2009; authors’ interview, 
April 2010).  This is particularly important in the context of countries that do not 
participate in the GAC or are sceptical of it and have pushed for, under the banner of 
‘enhanced cooperation’, a greater role for the International Telecommunication Union in 
domain name management and an IGF.  The EU then, has supported the principle of 
multi-stakeholderism within Internet governance, both in ICANN and the IGF, the latter 
created as a compromise within the World Summit on the Information Society process 
after the EU supported by the developing world, put forth an alternative proposition for a 
multilateral and more equal governance structure. This failed to achieve its aims because 
of the US refusal to move on the underlying principles of private sector leadership and 
management and its belief that (unilateral) US control was essential for the security and 
stability of the Internet.  The EU considered the IGF as an alternative forum for 
discussion which did not in any way replace existing institutional arrangements. There 
has been a high level of coherence internally within the EU on this matter, including 
strong support from the European Parliament on the continuation of the IGF which 
allowed the EU to speak with a single voice within the 2010 IGF review process under 
UN auspices.  
In its assessment of the IGF, the EU’s HLGIG concluded that it was a valuable ‘platform 
for non-binding multi-stakeholder dialogue on Internet governance’, and that its impact 
was displayed ‘in the light of what has followed outside the IGF in that the IGF has 
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triggered follow-up discussions in the context of dynamic coalitions and inspired debates 
at all levels’ (Internet Governance Hearing, May 2009). On the basis of the HLGIG’s 
evaluation, the formal EU position projected by the Czech Presidency within the initial 
UN discussions on the IGF (in May 2009), was that it should ‘continue as a non-decision 
making body for a further five years and at the end of that second period it should again 
be reviewed in terms of its desirability within a broader review of WSIS outcomes’ (Ibid 
2009). This was a position that was reiterated in letters by the subsequent Swedish 
Presidency (jointly with the Commission in December 2009) and the Spanish Presidency 
(without the Commission in March 2010).  
Having said this, whilst the outcome of the IGF review certainly reflected the preferences 
of the EU and other major actors (i.e. it was given a further five year mandate), the EU 
must still demonstrate more obviously in practice its rhetorical commitment to the multi-
stakeholderism principle that underpins the IGF if it is to gain more credibility 
internationally as an actor in Internet governance. Indeed, whilst there is some evidence 
to suggest that there has been absorption of the multistakeholder principle in the EU’s 
internal process, through institutional mimicry of the IGF at EU Member State level and 
the Commission’s participation in multistakeholder European Internet Governance 
platforms such as EuroDIG (see www.eurodig.org), it could be argued that it does not 
‘walk the talk’ as much as it could in practicing multi-stakeholderism and promoting 
European multistakeholder platforms (authors’ interview, April 2010).            
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CONCLUSIONS 
This article has shown the EU to have developed into an important actor in global 
electronic network communications policy-making through a comparative analysis of its 
activities in telecommunications and the Internet seen through the complementary 
analytical lenses of opportunity; internal factors; and presence. The article has pointed to 
a number of similarities, but also clear differences, in EU behaviour in these related, 
though at the same time rather different, sub-sectors. The evidence and analysis presented 
also underlines the conditions under which the EU is more likely, and less likely to be 
able to exert itself successfully in global sectoral contexts.  
TABLE 2 HERE 
It is important to note that though telecommunications is much longer established than 
the Internet, in both cases the EU’s involvement as a global policy actor has been 
relatively recent. Here, it faced a challenging international operating environment in 
terms of capitalizing on external opportunities and the establishment of a convincing 
international actor presence due to the domination of US ideas and practices. The 
telecommunications case provided more opportunities than constraints compared with the 
Internet. An explanation for this lies in the fairly obvious fact that EU Member States had 
developed, over a much longer period, knowledge of, and competence in, 
telecommunications compared to the Internet. It is also the case too that both the EU and 
the US arguably stood to gain most from developing and exercising their presence 
through the pursuit of  a similar agenda of international trade liberalization in institutional 
contexts such as the WTO, in particular. Though a relatively new actor in 
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telecommunications, the EU was able to develop quickly its presence as a key 
representative of its Member States in the WTO despite harbouring reservations. Given 
the strong (and perhaps unusual) coherence of EU positions, due in considerable part to 
powerful internal factors bound up in the contemporaneous intra-EU policy agreement on 
telecommunications liberalisation, the European Commission was viewed as the best 
means of securing EU interests in the WTO on telecommunications. A future challenge 
for the EU in this sector is to ensure that its coherence in policy construction and 
projection can be translated into more effective implementation of its agenda for 
extensive global trade liberalization, beyond some more recent aspirational policy 
statements and consultations. At the time of writing, there is currently no clear evidence 
of significant progress having been made in this regard. 
The Internet presents a rather different situation. The EU was not able to develop any 
kind of coherent position on its governance internally before it became a high profile 
global communications policy matter. Thus, since the late 1990s, the EU has aimed to 
articulate and establish its interests and presence in relevant global institutional contexts 
from a position of relative weakness, certainly compared to that experienced in the 
telecommunications case. The result has inevitably been one of partial success. A major 
external constraint has been the relative power differential and the EU’s key policy 
differences with the US. There are, however, signs that the two parties are much more 
aligned in their preferences for future Internet governance than in the past. The EU has 
gained policy ground and established a relatively strong presence, assisted by significant 
uncertainty and some turbulence in the development of global Internet policy agendas, 
which has involved contestation of ICANN and the IGF.  
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As shown in the article, the EU, however, has struggled in the past to project a clear, 
cogent message on Internet governance. This can be accounted for in terms of our model 
by the persistence of informal internal policy processes for constructing positions on key 
external policy matters and the opportunities that this afforded those in the Commission 
with their own political agenda to influence global proceedings. The result has been 
multiple messages, evidence of split presence through multiple EU representatives in 
different global fora and consequent confusion over what the ‘real’ EU position was. This 
did not imbue the EU with the visibility or credibility required to be as influential as it 
could have been in many instances. The Information Society and Media Commissioner, 
Neelie Kroes, who succeeded Viviane Reding, has apparently adopted a less assertive 
role and, as illustrated in the article, there is evidence of the development of an  internal 
mechanism that is delivering more consensual policy-making and the projection of more 
coherent EU positions in matters of crucial importance for the future of Internet 
governance. Nevertheless, given the lack of legal mandate underpinning the policy 
process, this does not preclude individuals and institutions from projecting their own 
autonomous positions in the future without reference to the established, albeit informal, 
mechanism established through the HLGIG. The lack of formal external EU 
representation will continue to be problematic for the EU and threatens to undermine the 
EU’s policy aspiration to be taken seriously as a leader and coherent actor in Internet 
governance, beyond its own rhetorical self-projections. Addressing this would certainly 
alleviate the two key problems of identifying first, the ‘official’ EU position (and the 
process through which it is constructed), and second, which party speaks and negotiates 
for the EU on Internet governance. It could serve to allow the EU to exert its influence 
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more purposefully on key issues, such as the renewal of the IANA contract in 2012. More 
broadly, it may contribute to the achievement of the policy objectives of ensuring the 
efficiency, accountability and sustainability of the multi-stakeholder model the EU 
supports and projects.        
Endnotes 
                                                 
1 Essentially relinquishing US unilateral control over ICANN 
2 And the EU Telecommunications Committee in which national Member States were represented. 
3 Neelie Kroes, successor to Viviane Reding as Commissioner for Information Society and Media, has been 
less assertive in relation to Internet governance and it is noticeable that the Commission seems to have 
moved towards a more consensual approach internally on Internet governance given her appointment 
(author’s interview, April 2010).    
4 Which replaced the Joint Project Agreement between the US Department of Commerce and ICANN on 1 
October 2009 
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Table 1 Telecommunications and the Internet: Comparative Criteria 
Criterion    Internet   Telecommunications 
Technological change strong strong 
International features strong strong 
Internationalisation speed strong strong 
Historic EU presence weak weak 
Propensity for change strong strong 
Historic governance self-regulatory state-led 
Global institutional context Evolving  Well established but 
changing 
EU national centricity low high 
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Table 2 The EU as an actor in Telecommunications and Internet Governance 
 Telecommunications  Internet Governance  
Opportunity  Key actors: US and Japan, MNCs and 
major Telecoms companies   
Factors: Globalisation, liberalisation, free 
market neo-liberalism  
Key actors: US government dominant, 
although this has now dissipated 
somewhat given the Affirmation of 
Commitments 
Factors: Commercialisation, global 
inter-operability of the Internet, crisis 
challenging self-regulation as 
governance tool  
 
Internal  Formal process of policy construction 
(trade) 
Commission as lead agent (Member State 
as Principals)  
Coherence, with the Commission 
projecting a clear message at the WTO 
 
Informal process (no formal mandate) 
HLGIG lead in policy construction 
with Commission  
Commission/Presidency as lead 
external representatives and EU 
Member State representatives. 
Coherence/consensus when 
constructing positions on key issues 
such as the renewal of the IGF and the 
Affirmation of Commitments. 
Presence Presence – strong  
 Some normative/ideological and 
structural constraints in 
implementation 
Able to act with purpose in order to 
influence key regulations through: 
 Alignment with/support 
for/projection of neoliberal ideas 
(with US/MNCs etc) 
 Perception as credible 
international economic actor thus 
able to project policies/form 
alliances with key 
MNCs/telecoms companies 
challenging dominant ITU 
positions  
 
Presence – medium 
 Structural and normative 
constraints  
 
 Informal process worked 
well, and a coherent message 
was projected where there 
were no internal 
contradictions/ independent 
interventions in process 
 Hindered in terms of 
‘presence’ (influence and 
action) by confusion among 
other actors on who projects 
the official EU position in 
certain fora (GAC, IGF). 
Issues of visibility and 
credibility 
 
